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I. INTRODUCTION
International trade has increased dramatically in recent years
as many developing nations have entered the world economic
market.' Economic dealings and business relationships invariably
produce disputes, oftentimes complicated when parties from
developed and developing countries are involved.' Whether
resolved through the national court system of a party to the
dispute or through an arbitration tribunal, the dispute usually
results in a settlement of some sort. This Note focuses upon the
enforcement process of the settlement, particularly in the context
of a conflict between developed and developing countries. At the
outset, a consideration of the reasons underlying the enforcement
or non-enforcement of foreign country judgments and arbitral
awards is undertaken. An examination of the various multilateral
treaties and national legislation concerning enforcement follows.
The goal of conflicts law should be resolution of the traditional
problems to enforcement and uniformization of the procedures
used, procedures which will benefit both developed and develop-
ing countries.'
II. SURVEY OF ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
When a dispute arises between parties, they usually seek a
quick and effective settlement. Settlements of varying form4 can
be reached through numerous procedures.' Two forms will be con-
See generally W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11-12,
21-25, 170-76, 341-61 (1964); Domke & Glossner, The Present State of the Law Regarding In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (M.
Bos ed. 1973).
Achebe, The United States Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958. Implications for United States Investors in
Nigeria, 9 TEX. INT'L L.J. 157, 159 n.7 (1974); see also Smedresman, Conflict of Laws in In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration: A Survey of Recent Developments, 7 COL. WEST. INT'L
L.J. 263 (1977).
' See Wesley, The Procedural Malaise of Foreign Investment Disputes in Latin
America: From Local Tribunals to Fact-finding, 7 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 813, 814-15 (1975);
see also Achebe, supra note 2, at 158, 172.
The most common are judgments and arbitral awards.
Examples are judicial proceedings, arbitration, negotiation, conciliation, and fact-
finding commissions.
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sidered herein: an arbitral award and a judgment. An arbitral
award represents the finding of an arbitration tribunal. The
jurisdiction of the tribunal and its composition usually are
prescribed by clauses within the original business contract.' The
arbitration procedure represents the mutual bargained-for agree-
ment of the contracting parties. Conversely, a judgment repre-
sents the decision of a national court. Few contracts involving par-
ties of different countries provide for the settlement of economic
disputes by the courts of one nation or another.' Resort to judicial
proceedings therefore is seldom by mutual agreement, but rather
indicates an unwillingness to negotiate further. Clearly, the
stigma attached to court proceedings is more ominous than that of
an arbitration tribunal. However, regardless of the method of
dispute settlement utilized, there remains the matter of enforce-
ment of the settlement.
Enforcement is the effectualization of the settlement rendered,
whether arbitral award or judgment. The codes of procedure of
most nations provide methods through which judgments of the na-
tion's courts can be enforced within the forum country against
those persons subject to the jurisdiction of the court.' Similarly,
each state within the United States has rules outlining the pro-
cedure to be followed for enforcement of judgments of the state
courts.' The enforcement of a judgment rendered in State A of the
United States is summarily enforced in State B of the United
States under the full faith and credit doctrine,"0 which requires
that the courts of State B give full effect to the judgment of State
A's courts just as if the judgment had been rendered by a court in
State B. Obviously, if international law contained a full faith and
credit doctrine, enforcement of a judgment rendered in Nation A
would not present a problem in Nation B. However, because the
' Vuylsteke, Foreign Investment Protection and ICSID Arbitration, 4 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 343, 346 (1974).
' One author suggests that lawyers are reluctant to discuss such matters because it may
disturb signing of the business contract. Achebe, supra note 2, at 171.
1 The various procedures outlined for the enforcement of foreign country judgments and
arbitral awards within national codes of procedure are discussed in greater detail later in
this Note.
' The procedure used within the United States is an action upon the judgment, discussed
in detail later in this Note.
10 Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution mandates that "full faith and
credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other state." UNITED STATES CONST. art. IV § 1.
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full faith and credit doctrine is not a part of international law, a
settlement rendered in Nation A is not mandatory in Nation B.
III. AWARDS VS. JUDGMENTS
Although enforcement of an arbitral award or foreign country
judgment is not mandatory, the majority of awards and
judgments based on contractual obligations between parties of dif-
ferent countries are complied with voluntarily."1 Arbitral awards
rendered by neutral tribunals, submitted for enforcement to the
domestic court of a country in which the losing party has proper-
ty, are more likely to be enforced by the domestic court than is a
judgment rendered by a foreign national court based on the same
dispute.12 The reasons are subtle yet important. First, an arbitral
award is the culmination of a bargained-for procedure agreed
upon by the contracting parties, whereas a foreign judgment
represents the act of the courts of a foreign sovereign.13 No
sovereign state relishes the unchallengeable extraterritorial ap-
plication of a foreign judgment as to one of its citizen's or as to the
state's economic activities. To many of the newly-independent
developing countries, such an action is reminiscent of colonial im-
perialism. Second, the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda14 is of con-
siderable importance to the enforcement of arbitral awards. Not
only does the doctrine dictate that the contract and its con-
stituent clauses, including arbitration clauses, be honored, but
also that the arbitral award be honored.15 Third, voluntary com-
pliance with an arbitral award allows the parties to continue their
business relationship without a substantial diminution in the
original spirit of goodwill."6
" See Sanders, International Commercial Arbitration, 20 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 37, 40 (1973). It is estimated that 90% of the arbitral awards
rendered by the International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.) Court of Arbitration are com-
plied with voluntarily. Mirabito, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The First Four Years, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
471, 482 (1975).
11 Vuylsteke, supra note 6, at 357.
3 d.
' Id. at 358. The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (agreements are made to be kept) is a
recognized principle of international law. Id. See also W. Friedmann, THE CHANGING STRUC-
TURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 300 (1964).
15 See Vuylsteke, supra note 6, at 358.
" Tiewul & Tsegah, Arbitration and the Settlement of Commercial Disputes: A Selec-
tive Survey of African Practice, 24 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 393, 410 (1975).
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IV. NON-ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Underlying the refusal of State B's courts to enforce the
judgments rendered in State A is a general feeling of distrust
among many countries. 7 Few countries completely trust the
political and economic motives of other countries with which they
deal. This distrust is intensified between developing and
developed countries, due in many instances to exploitive colonial
relationships and current economic disparities.
Investors from developed countries often distrust the court
systems of developing countries, believing that such courts will be
biased against them either:
(1) Because such systems are vastly different in their origins and
application and their substantive and procedural rules from that
of the investor's native countries; or (2) because, in fact, the
treatment foreigners receive, even if comparable to that afford-
ed nationals, may be below that of their own countries; or (3)
because some local court systems simply lack the sophistication
needed to resolve complex commercial disputes."
Distrust extends not only to the court system, but also to arbitra-
tion proceedings located in a foreign country, especially where
foreign law is stipulated in the arbitration agreement as ap-
plicable.19
Conversely, developing countries distrust litigation in
developed countries and believe that any method of dispute settle-
ment would be biased toward the investor." Developing countries,
aware of past exploitation, believe that foreign litigation repre-
sents an attempt to continue foreign domination by developed
countries.21 Perhaps nowhere in the developing world is distrust
more openly manifested than in Latin America as illustrated in
the Calvo Doctrine,22 which dictates that contracting parties agree
" See Wesley, supra note 3, at 814.
S Id. See also Achebe, supra note 2, at 170.
"9 See Achebe, supra note 2, at 170.
20 Id. at 167.
" Wesley, supra note 3, at 814.
22 Wesley states:
Conceived as a device to resist economic imperialism from Europe, the Calvo
Clause ... prevents an alien from skirting the jurisdiction of a local tribunal by
procuring diplomatic espousal of his claim. As a standard provision in most con-
cession agreements, the clause's principal function is to shut off diplomatic in-
tervention by the concessionaire's parent country in the event of a commercial
dispute.... A number of common provisions thread the clause: (1) submission to
local jurisdiction; (2) application of local law; (3) assimilation of foreigners for pur-
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to submit to local jurisdiction only and to waive all other judicial
recourse, thus eliminating outside intervention by other coun-
tries." In light of past colonial exploitation and imperialistic at-
titudes of the developed countries, the fears of the developing
countries seem well founded. Not surprisingly, the national public
policy of many states may dictate that enforcement of a foreign
judgment is contrary to public policy. However, courts are not
eager to explain a refusal to enforce a judgment or arbitral award
strictly in terms of public policy. Instead, courts have erected fic-
tions, cloaked in judicial rhetoric yet anchored substantively in
public policy concerns and political doctrines, which are used as
obstacles to prevent enforcement of a foreign judgment or ar-
bitral award.
One obstacle to enforcement is reciprocity."' Traditionally, as a
matter of course, the courts of State A would not enforce the
judgments of the courts of State B unless the courts of State B
would reciprocate and enforce the judgments of State A.
Reciprocity is a non-controversial means for the court to rule that
enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to the public
policy of the forum state.
Another obstacle to enforcement is the claim of sovereign im-
munity.2' The essence of the claim in its political sense is that acts
poses of local contractual agreements; (4) waiver of diplomatic protection by the
foreigner's home state; and (5) surrender of rights arising under international law.
Wesley, supra note 3, at 818.
In essence, the Calvo Doctrine requires an absolute waiver of foreign redress for aliens
and foreign corporations. Id. at 821. In addition, it is strictly applied by the Latin American
countries. For an excellent discussion of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America, see Wesley,
supra note 3, 818-39. See generally Friedman, The Changing Structure of International
Arbitration Conventions: The Quandry of Non-Ratification, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131 (1976).
' Wesley, supra note 3, at 821.
" Reciprocity was expressly stated by the United States Supreme Court as a require-
ment for recognition and enforcement of a foreign country judgment in the United States.
In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), the Court refused to enforce a French judgment
solely on the grounds that French courts did not recognize judgments rendered in the
United States. Although never expressly overruled, the reciprocity requirement fortunate-
ly has been abandoned by a majority of the states in the United States. Reciprocity still
plagues international law, however, being recognized in treaties regarding enforcement and
in the national legislation of both developing and developed countries. See generally Hom-
burger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Yorker Reflects on
Uniform Acts, 18 AM. J. ComP. L. 367, 381-85 (1970); Mehren & Patterson, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States, 6 L. & POL'Y INTL Bus.
37, 46-48 (1974).
5 See generally Achebe, supra note 2, at 165-66; Mehren & Patterson, supra note 24, at
75-76; Tiewul & Tsegah, supra note 16, 408-09. The stance of the courts in the United States
in regard to this defense is that they will generally abide by a recommendation from the
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of a sovereign cannot be held subject to the jurisdiction of another
country's courts." If a government or government agency is a par-
ty to a contract, the government frequently raises the defense of
sovereign immunity before its domestic courts or foreign courts
when enforcement against the government is sought.' If the claim
of sovereign immunity is upheld during enforcement proceedings,
the court holds enforcement contrary to the forum state's public
policy and economic interests.
Similar and closely tied to the claim of sovereign immunity is
the act of state doctrine.28 In its political context, the doctrine
serves as a public policy obstacle and "precludes any review what-
soever of the acts of the government of one sovereign state done
within its own territory by the courts of another sovereign
state."" Yet, as related to the enforcement of foreign judgments,
the doctrine must be viewed in a different light, not as an obstacle
but as a valid independent reason for non-enforcement. If for in-
stance, State A nationalizes a particular industry whose assets
are owned by nationals of State B, then the act of state doctrine,
as seen in its political context, would preclude State B's courts
(F2) from reviewing the nationalization in toto. The claim of
sovereign immunity indicates that State A is not liable to State B
for acts committed in the name of the sovereign. However, the
analysis of the court of State A (Fl), when faced with a plea of en-
forcement of the F2 judgment, focuses upon the misapplication of
Fl's law by F2, thereby affording F1 ground upon which to refuse
enforcement of F2's judgment. In this context of the act of state
doctrine, F1 views the nationalization by the forum state as a
legislative or executive act, which simply replaces pre-existing
Department of State as to whether the sovereign should be immune. According to Mehren
and Patterson, "the State Department's view has been that courts should apply the 'restric-
tive theory' of sovereign immunity, under which foreign states are entitled to immunity
from liability arising out of their governmental acts, but are not entitled to immunity from
claims that concern their general commercial conduct." Mehren & Patterson, supra note 2,
at 75. The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity originated in the Tate Letter of 1952.
26 STATE DEPT BULL. 984 (1952).
' The claim has its basis in the notion that once a nation becomes a member of the inter-
national community, or in other words is recognized as sovereign, it is equal to all other
sovereigns. Therefore, an equal may not have jurisdiction to sit in judgment of another
equal. Tiewul & Tsegah, supra note 16, at 408. To allow jurisdiction would expose the con-
duct of foreign relations conducted by the political arm of government to potential embar-
rassment by judicial review. Achebe, supra note 24, at 167.
Mehren & Patterson, supra note 24, at 75.




conflicting law (ie. the pre-nationalization law, which recognized
the title to the assets as being vested in the nationals of State B).
Refusal by F2 to recognize and apply the nationalizing law as con-
trolling, and F2's insistence that title remains vested in the na-
tionals of State B, is seen by F1 as a straightforward misapplica-
tion of Fl's law and as a statement by F2 that application of the
nationalizing law is contrary to the public policy of F2. F1,
therefore, would refuse enforcement of F2's judgment, not under
the pretext that the acts of its sovereign are not subject to review
(the political context), but rather on grounds that F2 misapplied
the laws of Ft. Therein lies both the conflicts of law question
crucial to enforcement and the true reason supporting refusal to
enforce a foreign judgment.
The argument is essentially public policy versus public
policy -F2's contention that its public policy mandates misapplica-
tion of Fl's law versus Fl's contention that its public policy man-
dates non-enforcement of judgments rendered on the basis of
misapplication of F1 law in other forums. Although neither argu-
ment can be said to be clearly wrong, countries should not con-
struct judicial facades for underlying political doctrines and public
policy considerations. Removal of the surrounding rhetoric would
facilitate the identification and solution of the current problems to
enforcement.
V. REASONS FOR ENFORCEMENT
Most arbitral awards and judgments are complied with volun-
tarily." Voluntary compliance occurs for a number of reasons,
primarily because nations generally wish to be friendly with each
other. Voluntary compliance furthers peaceful coexistence and is
therefore desirable when not in conflict with other public policy
concerns. The desire to be friendly has gained expression through
the term comity.
Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obliga-
tion, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon
the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts
of another nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.3
' See I.C.C. estimates at note 11 supra.
"' Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). Many cases that enforce foreign country
1981]
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Additional reasons for voluntary compliance are that nations that
do not comply with an award or judgment can encounter dif-
ficulties in the world community, including a loss of credit 2 or the
imposition of economic sanctions." Another factor from the stand-
point of a developing country whose courts have refused to en-
force the terms of the settlement is the possibility that the
developed countries will either suspend aid' or render it difficult
for the developing country to receive aid from various interna-
tional organizations and agencies. Accordingly, developing coun-
tries often find voluntary compliance with awards and judgments
to be in their national interest.
VI. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS EMPLOYED
In addition to relying upon comity as a basis for complying with
the enforcement of judgments, some countries have attempted to
formulate conventional law through which enforcement is not only
required, but the procedure is standardized. Treaty law not only
has the advantages of predictability and ease of application, but
also serves to provide an identifiable mechanism for enforcement
upon which the parties to the dispute can rely. The most popular
and significant international attempts at codification of enforce-
ment procedures have been multilateral treaties.
A. Geneva Protocol and Convention
The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses (Geneva Protocol)36
judgments make reference to the famous language of the United States Supreme Court con-
cerning comity.
32 See Walde, Negotiating for Dispute Settlement in Transnational Mineral Contracts:
Current Practice, Trends, and an Evaluation from the Host Country's Perspective, 7 DEN.
J. INT'L & POLY 33, 56 (1977-78).
" For a scenario of the economic sanctions imposed by the United States against Peru
following the Peruvian government's nationalization of United States-owned industries
operating in Peru, see Arnold & Hamilton, The Greene Settlement: A Study of the Resolu-
tion of Investment Disputes in Peru, 13 TEX. INT'L L. J. 263, 280-81 (1977-78).
" An example of such a tactic used by the United States is the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1970). The provision, named after its sponsor the late Senator
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, provides that the President shall suspend assistance to the
government of any country nationalizing the property of or repudiating or nullifying con-
tracts with any United States citizen, unless such country takes appropriate steps within
six months to assure compensation for the full value of the property involved. For a sugges-
tion that the Hickenlooper amendment is defused if not dead, see Lillich, Requiem for
Hickenlooper, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 97 (1975).
" Because developed countries often fund and control the organizations, their potential
leverage against developing countries is clear.
"' Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, done Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 157 (effective
[Vol. 11:3
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and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards"7 (Geneva Convention) represent the first major
multilateral attempts3" to standardize the enforcement of arbitral
awards. Done under the auspices of the League of Nations,
signatories agreed to enforce arbitral awards in accordance with
respective national law regarding arbitration39 or in accordance
with the national law agreed upon by the parties as applicable."
Neither the Geneva Protocol nor the Geneva Convention gained
much support in the international community," especially in the
developing world, 4 and are of no importance in the enforcement of
arbitral awards today.43
B. The New York Convention
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
July 28, 1924) [hereinafter cited as Geneva Protocol]. The countries party to the Geneva
Protocol are: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta,
Mauritius, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. See generally
Mirabito, supra note 11, at 477-79; Evans & Ellis, International Commercial Arbitration: A
Comparison of Legal Regimes, 8 TEx. INT'L L. J. 17, 51-53 (1973).
1, Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done Sept. 26, 1927,
92 L.N.T.S. 301 (effective July 25, 1929) [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention]. The coun-
tries party to the Geneva Convention are: Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Mauritius, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. See generally Mirabito,
supra note 11, at 477-79; Evans & Ellis, supra note 36, at 51-53; and Sanders, supra note 11,
at 41-44.
1 See Mirabito, supra note 11, at 478. See, e.g., Evans & Ellis, Comparison of Legal
Regimes, supra note 36, at 51.
3 Geneva Protocol, supra note 36, at art. 3.
0 Geneva Convention, supra note 37, at art. 1. See Mirabito, supra note 11, at 478.
4, The United States was a signatory to neither the Geneva Protocol nor the Geneva
Convention. One writer suggests that the reason for non-participation by the United States
was that domestic courts and existing law were not ready to enforce arbitral awards
rendered in foreign countries. Mirabito, supra note 11, at 479.
42 At the time of the Geneva Protocol and Geneva Convention, most of the developing
countries were part of various colonial empires. Article 8 of the Geneva Protocol and article
10 of the Geneva Convention expressly provided that territories were not affected by the
provisions of the documents unless subsequently requested by the contracting state under
which the territory was held.
43 The Geneva Protocol and the Geneva Convention are not commonly used today.
However, the documents have served to provide the basis for the English Arbitration Act
of 1950. Evans & Ellis, supra note 36, at 33; Lew, The Arbitration Act of 1975, 24 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 870 (1975). They were also a starting point for later multilateral treaties regard-
ing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
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forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards," more commonly known
as the New York Convention,"5 expressly replaced the Geneva
Protocol and Geneva Convention for those countries which were
party to both." The New York Convention has met with
widespread approval from developing and developed countries.'7
The United States became a party to the Convention in 1970."
Article III of the Convention provides that each state should
"recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accor-
dance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the
award is relied upon."'9 Furthermore, no differentiation is to be
made between awards rendered by the forum state and those
rendered by foreign tribunals.' Under Article IV of the Conven-
tion, the enforcement procedure to be followed by the court and
the party seeking enforcement is not difficult: (a) file an applica-
tion for enforcement; (b) present the original award or copy; (c)
present the original arbitral agreement or copy; and (d) provide a
" The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
done June 10, 1958, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Dec. 29,
1970) [hereinafter cited as New York Convention]. See generally Achebe, supra note 2;
Domke, The United States Implementation of the United Nations Arbitral Convention, 19
AM. J. COMp. L. 575 (1971); Evans & Ellis, supra note 36; Lew, The Arbitration Act of 1975,
24 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 870 (1975); McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Conven-
tion on Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. CoM. 735 (1970-71);
Mirabito, supra note 11; Patkos, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 in light of the Greek Code of Civil Pro-
cedure of 1971, [19721 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 295 (1972); Sanders,
supra note 11.
4 Patkos, supra note 44, at 297.
" New York Convention, supra note 44, art. VII (2). The countries affected by this provi-
sion are: Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.
" The countries party to the New York Convention are: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Rep., Central African Rep., Chile,
Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, German Dem.
Rep., Germany, Fed. Rep., Ghana, Greece, The Holy See, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Democratic Kampuchea, Korea, Kuwait, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, the
Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, San Marino, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Ukranian Soviet Socialist Rep., Union of Soviet Socialist Reps., United
Kingdom, and the United States of America.
40 Implementing legislation within the United States is 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1970). For a
discussion of the background to United States accession, see Mirabito, supra note 11, at
485-87. See also Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 9
LAW. AMER. 43 (1977). For a complete discussion of 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, see McMahon, supra
note 44, at 735.
"' New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. III.
0 1&
19811 CONFLICTS OF LAW 645
translation of the above documents if in a language foreign to the
forum court." Article V(1) enumerates the procedural grounds
upon which a court or other competent authority may refuse to
enforce an arbitral award."2 Without more, the Convention would
represent an abandonment of the public policy impediments to en-
forcement discussed previously. 5 Unfortunately, however, such is
not the case.
Article V(2) provides two additional grounds for denial of en-
forcement, the use of which rest entirely within the discretion of
the court in which enforcement is sought.' First, enforcement
may be denied if, in the opinion of the court, the subject matter is
not capable of settlement by arbitration,5" and second, if enforce-
ment would be contrary to the public policy of the forum. 5 Thus,
" Id at art. IV. Article IV(c) indicates that awards may only be enforced if the parties
originally agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration.
52 Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where
the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) the parties ... were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity,
or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have sub-
jected it or, finding any indication thereon, under the law of the country where
the award was made; or
(b) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of
the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was other-
wise unable to present his case; or
(c) the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within
the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions
on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submit-
ted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to ar-
bitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not
in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority in which, or under the law of which, that
award was made.
New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. V(1).
For a discussion of article V(1), see Mirabito, supra note 11, at 490-91; and Sanders, supra
note 11, at 42-43. For a discussion of article V(1) in English law, see Lew, The Arbitration
Act of 1975, 24 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 870 (1975). For a discussion of African law in Sierra
Leone, see Tiewul & Tsegah, supra note 16, at 411-16. For the law in Nigeria, see Achebe,
supra note 2; in Greece, see Pathos, supra note 44; in France, Germany, and Japan, see
Evans & Ellis, supra note 36.
See notes 17-29 and accompanying text supra.
New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. V(2).
55 Id. (a) the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration
under the law of that country (where enforcement is sought).
Id (b) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country (where enforcement is sought).
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not only does the Convention codify enforcement procedures, it
also codifies the historical impediment to enforcement-public
policy. Additionally, Article 1(3) allows the signatories of the Con-
vention to attach two reservations to their acceptance of the Con-
vention: (1) a requirement of reciprocity and (2) that the conven-
tion will apply only to commercial matters as determined by the
signatory (in essence, a restatement of the act of state doctrine)."
Therefore, the judicial facades as well as public policy concerns
are adopted and codified within the Convention.
Another weakness of the Convention is the lack of any provi-
sion regarding penalties against a state party to the Convention
that refuses to follow the enforcement procedure stipulated in the
Convention.' A state that chooses not to fulfill its treaty obliga-
tion is not subject to a specified penalty under the Convention. A
final inherent shortcoming of the Convention is that it does not ap-
ply to judgments but rather only to arbitral awards. 9
The Convention also has numerous positive elements. For ex-
ample, it represents a genuine internationalization" ° of enforce-
ment procedures for arbitral awards and certainly renders the en-
forcement of such awards more certain." Countries that formerly
would not consider enforcing a foreign award summarily, in-
cluding the United States, now have a treaty obligation to do so.
What formerly was an uncertain procedure at best, can now be ac-
complished summarily under the Convention." Parties seeking en-
forcement have the advantage of knowing, from the outset, what
to expect procedurally and can point to a treaty obligation by the
forum state as reason for summary enforcement." These features
of the Convention operate not only as an advantage for investors
from developed countries, but also represent an advantage for
contracting parties from developing countries. Certainly, one of
the greatest attributes of the Convention as far as developing
countries are concerned may be the recognition of party
" Id. art. 1(3). The second reservation, as to commercial matters, is similar to the Connal-
ly Reservation, which the United States attached to its agreement to submit to the jurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice. The potential for abuse of this reservation is
alarming because it allows each country to decide which awards it will enforce without
regard to what other countries consider to be arbitrable commercial matters.
' See New York Convention, supra note 44; Mirabito, supra note 11, at 499.
" New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. I(1); Mirabito, supra note 11, at 500.
" See Lew, The Arbitration Act of 1975, 24 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 870 (1975).
61 I
6 See New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. IV; Mirabito, supra note 11, at 499.
6 Mirabito, supra note 11, at 499.
d.
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autonomy. 5 Under the Convention, the law stipulated by the par-
ties will be held to govern the dispute." This is a welcome
development"7 in international law and allows developing coun-
tries to negotiate contracts in which it is stipulated that their law
will apply, a stipulation which will then be respected in all states
party to the Convention.
Case law in the United States concerning the New York Con-
vention is relatively sparse. This is due in part to the recent acces-
sion of the United States to the Convention" and in part to the
fact that, as noted above, most arbitral awards are complied with
voluntarily." In addition, the case law is entirely federal because
of the original jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts.
Generally, courts in the United States have confirmed arbitral
awards under the Convention," even when to do so placed United
States businessmen and interests at a disadvantage. 2 In the Mat-
ter of Fotochrome, Inc.,"3 the court, on the basis of the Convention,
confirmed an arbitral award rendered by a Japanese tribunal and
stated: "International trade is so important to our economy and to
the peace and welfare of the world that our law is justified in
assuaging other nation's suspicions by the firm enforcement of
treaties we find applicable.""
New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. V(1)(a)(d). For a discussion of the recogni-
tion of party autonomy within the New York Convention, see Lew, The Arbitration Act of
1975, 24 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 870 (1975), which discusses the 1975 English Arbitration Act
and the implementary legislation within England of the New York Convention.
New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. V(1)(a).
67 Lew, the Arbitration Act of 1975, 24 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 870 (1975).
66 The United States became party to the New York Convention in 1970. See note 11
supra.
'9 See note 11 supra.
" U.S.C. § 203 (1970) states: " An action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall
be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of
the United States . . . shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding,
regardless of the amount in controversy." Id.
"' Lamenories-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga.
1980); Biotromik v. Medford Med. Inst., 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976); Amoco Overseas Oil
Co. v. Astir Navigation Co., 490 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Jugomental v. Samincorp, Inc.,
78 F.R.D. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft v. Overseas
Motors, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Ipitrade Int'l v. Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, 465 F.
Supp. 824 (D.C.C. 1978); Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d
334 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. N.Y. 1974),
aff'd 517 F.2d 512 (5122nd Cir. 1975); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe
Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2nd Cir. 1974).
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The trend of United States courts, when faced with defenses to
enforcement, has been to construe narrowly such defenses,
thereby usually dismissing the claimed defense."5 In Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie Du
Papier," the court confirmed an award in favor of an Egyptian
corporation and against a United States Corporation (Overseas).
In doing so, the court noted that the basic thrust of the Conven-
tion was to liberalize procedures for enforcing foreign arbitral
awards,77 a thrust which indicated a narrow construction of any
defenses to enforcement." The first defense addressed by the
court was that enforcement would be contra to the public policy of
the forum. 9 The court held that enforcement would be denied only
where it would violate the forum state's "most basic notions of
morality and justice."80 The court further distinguished national
policy from public policy81 and noted:
This provision [Art. V(2)(b)] was not meant to enshrine the
vagaries of international politics under the rubric of public
policy. Rather, a circumscribed public policy doctrine was con-
templated by the Convention's framers and every indication is
that the United States, in acceding to the Convention, meant to
subscribe to this supranational emphasis. 2
A second defense claimed was that the subject matter was not
capable of settlement by arbitration. 3 Again, the court adopted a
5 Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 575 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1978); Imperial
Ethiopian Government v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1976); In re
Fotochrome Inc. 377 F. Supp. 26, (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd 517 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1975); Parsons
& Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d
969 (2d Cir. 1974); Stauborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1974);
Lamenories-Trefileries-Cablerieo de Lens v. Southwire Co., 484 F.- Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga.
1980); MCT Shipping Corp. v. Sabet, 497 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Amoco Overseas Oil
Co. v. Astir Navigation Company, Ltd., 490 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Audi NSU Auto
Union Aktiengesellschaft v. Overseas Motors, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Mich. 1976);
Brotromik v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976). But see Lib-
yan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175
(D.D.C. 1980); Splosna Plovba of Piran v. Agrelak Steamship Corp., 381 F. Supp. 1368
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
Papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).









narrow construction,"4 dismissing the defense in stating: "The
mere fact that an issue of national interest may incidentally figure
into the resolution of a breach of contract claim does not make the
dispute not arbitrable.""5 The court quickly dismissed Oversea's
contention that it had not had an adequate opportunity to present
a defense or that it otherwise was denied due process8 by finding
that difficulties in presenting a witness in international arbitra-
tion is an inherent risk of such arbitration,8" a process voluntarily
agreed upon by Overseas. Another defense raised by Overseas
was that the arbitration was in excess of jurisdiction. Finding
that a narrow construction "would comport with the enforcement-
facilitating thrust of the Convention," 9 the court held that
"[a]lthough the Convention recognizes that an award may not be
enforced where predicted on a subject matter outside the ar-
bitrator's jurisdiction, it does not sanction second-guessing the ar-
bitrator's construction of the parties' agreement."90 Finally, the
court rejected Overseas' defense that the arbitrators had acted in
manifest disregard of the law,9' because, even assuming such a
defense existed under the Convention, 2 it would require exten-
sive judicial review thereby frustrating the purpose of arbitra-
tion.9"
Similarly, in Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens v.
Southwire,9 the court confirmed an arbitral award in favor of a
French manufacturer against a Georgia corporation, the
Southwire Company. Citing Parsons, the court adopted a narrow
construction of public policy95 and found no violation of it even
though the award rendered had used interest rates usually con-
sidered usurious in Georgia.9" The court also dismissed
84 Id.
" Id. at 975.
N Id.
87 Id.
" Id. at 976.
89 Id,
"o Id. at 977.
91 Id.
9 The court found that even though article V of the New York Convention did not
recognize the defense, 9 U.S.C. § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act has been read to create
an implied defense to enforcement where the award is rendered in manifest disregard of
the law, even where enforcement is sought under the New York Convention. Id. In accord
MCT Shipping Corp. v. Sabet, 497 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Stavborg v. National
Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424 (2nd Cir. 1974).
93 Id.
484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
" Id at 1068.
" Id at 1069. However, the court refused to enforce that part of the interest awarded
which was purely penal rather than compensatory.
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Southwire's claim of misconduct on the part of the arbitrators in
not allowing certain proffered evidence 1, by stating that "barring
a clear showing of abuse of discretion, the court will not vacate an
award based on improper evidence or the lack of proper
evidence.""8 In addition, the court adopted a narrow stance in re-
jecting Southwire's claim that the award was made in disregard of
market price.9
In Biotronik v. Medford,' ° the court confirmed a Swiss award in
favor of a West German company against a United States com-
pany despite claims of fraud.'' Adopting a narrow construction of
fraud, the court held that it would require a convincing showing of
fraud before upsetting an award.' 2 Awards in favor of developing
countries have been confirmed as well.' 3 In Ethiopia v. Baruch-
Foster,'°4 the court confirmed an arbitral award under the Conven-
tion in favor of the Ethiopian government, holding that the loser
in arbitration cannot "freeze the confirmation proceedings in their
tracks and indefinitely postpone judgment by merely requesting
discovery."'0 ° Other cases decided under the Convention have
allowed set-offs of the awards,"' and one court has even applied
the Convention retroactively.' '
An additional defense to enforcement of the arbitral award,
raised in several cases, is the lack of explicit agreement within the
arbitration clause of the contract that a judgment shall be entered
1, Id. at 1067.
98 Id.
Id. at 1068. Southwire protested use of the legal rate of interest in effect in France by
the arbitrators rather than the appropriate Georgia legal rate of interest. The court held
that in making an award the arbitrator may draw upon personal knowledge.
0 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976).
0, Medford Medical Instrument Co. raised the defense of fraud under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a),
even though the defense is not recognized under article V of the New York Convention.
The court refused to express an opinion as to whether the defense could be implied under
the New York Convention. Id. at 140. The court found that Medford's real complaint was
failure of the other party to present evidence favorable to Medford's case. Id. at 138.
0.. Id. at 135.
,03 An example discussed previously is the Parsons case, supra note 71, wherein the court
enforced an award in favor of an Egyptian corporation. Other courts have enforced
judgments based on an underlying arbitral award in favor of a developing country. See
Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2nd Cir. 1973); New
Central Jute Mills Co. v. City Trade & Industries, Ltd., 318 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1971).
'0, 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1976).
05 Id. at 337.
o0 Jagomental v. Samincorp, Inc. 78 F.R.D. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
0.. In re Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 377 F. Supp. 26, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd 517 F.2d
512 (2nd Cir. 1975).
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upon the award rendered."8 Although several courts have
recognized the defense, they have placed a narrow construction
upon it and have found either consent by implication or by con-
duct of the parties to satisfy the requirement."9 Case law involv-
ing and interpreting the Convention has not been abundant, but it
clearly indicates a willingness on the part of the courts to confirm
and thereby to enforce the awards and to construe narrowly any
and all defenses raised against enforcement.
C. ICSID
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States,"' concluded under
the sponsorship of the World Bank,"' established the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),"2
108 Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft v. Overseas Motors, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 982
(E.D. Mich. 1976); Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424 (2nd Cir. 1974).
The defense is based upon 9 U.S.C. § 9, which provides that enforcement of the arbitral
award is appropriate only where the parties "in their agreement have agreed that a judg-
ment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration .... 418 F.
Supp. 982 (1976); 500 F.2d 424 (1974).
500 F.2d at 425-27; 418 F. Supp. at 984-85.
10 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, done August 25, 1965, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S.
159 (entered into force for the United States October 14, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Conven-
tion on Investment Disputes]. The implementing legislation within the United States is the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 344 (1966), 22
U.S.C § 1650, 1650(a) (1970). For discussion of the ICSID and the Convention on Investment
Disputes, see Amerasinghe, Submissions to the Jurisdiction of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 211 (1973-74). See generally
Mirabito, supra note 11, 483-84; Wesley, supra note 3, 841-44; Schmidt, Arbitration Under
the Auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID):
Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Govern-
ment of Jamaica, 17 HARV. INTL L. J. 90 (1976); Vuylsteke, supra note 6; Wilde, supra note
32, at 53-58. Those countries member to the Convention on Investment Disputes are:
Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Rep.,
Chad, China (Taiwan), Congo, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia,
Germany, (Fed. Rep.), Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory
Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar
(Malagasy Rep.), Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, the
Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Uganda, United Kingdom, United States of America, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and
Zambia.
.. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, better known as the
World Bank, sponsored the Convention on Investment Disputes. See Domke & Glossner,
The Present State of the Law Regarding International Commercial Arbitration in THE
PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 307, 322 (M. Bos ed. 1973).
"2 The ICSID is the organ established by the Convention on Investment Disputes to ar-
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through which the Convention would be applied. As its name sug-
gests, the Convention applies only to investment disputes."3 Arti-
cle 54(1) provides:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pur-
suant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it
were a final judgment of a court of that state. A Contracting
State with a federal Constitution may enforce such an award in
or through its federal courts and may provide that such courts
shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts
of a constituent state."'
Some writers"' suggest that this Convention is the most effective
instrument in existence for the enforcement of arbitral awards
despite its limited application. Not only is the award to be treated
as final and binding without being subject to review by national
courts,"' but also there cannot be a per se public policy exception
to enforcement."' Although the obstacle of sovereign immunity is
expressly provided for,"8 it is in fact largely restricted."9
Succinctly stated, an arbitral award cannot be denied enforce-
ment because of the vagaries of a state's substantive law or public
policy.'20 Adding further to the effectiveness of the Convention is
the fact that only two reservations avail themselves to those
states wishing to become party to the Convention: (1) the right to
determine which classes of disputes it will submit to the jurisdic-
range for arbitral tribunals and to assure application of the Convention on Investment
Disputes to arrange for arbitral tribunals and to assure application of the Convention on In-
vestment Disputes during arbitration proceedings. Convention on Investment Disputes,
supra note 110, at art. 1(1)(2). See Vuylsteke, supra note 6.
,,3 Convention on Investment Disputes, supra note 110, at arts. 1(2), 25. See Mirabito,
supra note 11, 483.
..4 Convention on Investment Disputes, supra note 110, at art. 54(1). This provision,
which mandates full faith and credit, is of particular importance to the United States
because of its federal structure.
... See Schmidt, supra note 110, at 104; Vuylsteke, supra note 6, at 358, 360; W- aide, supra
note 32, at 71.
"' Convention on Investment Disputes, supra note 110, at art. 54(1). See Schmidt, supra
note 110, at 105; Vuylsteke, supra note 6, at 359.
.. A public policy exception is not found within the Convention on Investment Disputes.
However, the Convention does recognize sovereign immunity in article 55, which is essen-
tially a public policy concern as discussed herein. On the lack of a public policy exception,
see Schmidt, supra note 110, at 105; Vuylsteke, supra note 6, at 358.
118 Convention on Investment Disputes, supra note 110, at art. 55. See, e.g., Vuylsteke,
supra note 6, at 360.
,' See Amerasinghe, supra note 110, at 248; Schmidt, supra note 110, at 106.
'2 See Schmidt, supra note 110, at 105.
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tion of the ICSID;'2 ' and (2) a requirement that there be an exhaus-
tion of local remedies.' Many developing countries in Africa'23
and Asia agree to use the ICSID in their investment dealings,'24
but the reception in Latin America 5 has been cold because of that
region's unswerving distrust of other countries as exemplified by
the Calvo doctrine. 12
D. Inter-American Convention
The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration'27 is the. most recent multilateral attempt to standard-
ize enforcement procedures. The Convention is of great impor-
tance to the countries of the Western Hemisphere128 because it
marks a significant departure by the developing Latin American
countries from their traditional Calvo Doctrine-oriented stance
' Convention on Investment Disputes, supra note 110, at art. 25(4).
Id. art. 26.
,W3 For discussion and survey of the use of arbitration, including use of the ICSID, in
Africa, see Tiewul & Tsegah, supra note 16.
,2, See Tiewul & Tsegah, supra note 16, at 407; Wilde, supra note 32, at 46.
'M See Mirabito, supra note 11, at 484; Walde, supra note 32, at 46-47. For additional in-
formation on Latin America's position on the ICSID, see the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Committee on Arbitration, The Inter-American Convention on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration, reprinted in 9 LAW. OF AMERS. 43, 51 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as ABANY, The Inter-American Convention]; Schmidt, supra note 110, at 138-40;
Wesley, supra note 3, at 842. Latin America's distaste for the Convention on Investment
Disputes is unfortunate because both the ICSID and the Convention on Investment
Disputes is directed to Latin America. Mirabito, supra note 11, at 484.
2 For a brief discussion of the conflict between the Convention on Investment Disputes
and the Calvo Doctrine, see Schmidt, supra note 110, at 138-40.
127 The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, done Jan.
30, 1975, OAS/Ser. A/20 (SEPF); 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS. 336 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Inter-American Convention]. The text can also be found at ABANY, The Inter-American
Convention, supra note 125, at 68-72. At last count, thirteen of the twenty member states of
the Organization of American States (OAS) had signed the Convention, but only two of
these, Panama and Chile, had ratified the Convention. The other signatories are: Brazil,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Those OAS countries that have not signed the Inter-American
Convention are: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and
Tobago, and the United States. For discussion of non-ratification of the Convention, see Ab-
bott, Latin America and International Arbitration Conventions: The Quandry of Non-
Ratification, 17 HARV. INT'L L. J. 131 (1976).
Apparently, the United States did not sign the Inter-American Convention because
the government wanted review and comment upon the Convention by interested organiza-
tions. See ABANY, The Inter-American Convention, supra note 125, at 43, 58; Norberg,
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Revisited, 7 LAW.OF AMERS. 275 (1975). Despite only
two ratifications, the Inter-American Convention is currently effective as per article 10 of
the Convention. Ratification is not limited to OAS countries, according to article 9 of the
Convention.
"' See ABANY, The Inter-American Convention, supra note 125, at 43.
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toward the enforcement of arbitral awards.129 It is hoped that this
departure is indicative of a future trend. The Convention provides
that an arbitral award "shall have the force of a final judicial judg-
ment," ' and that execution of the award is to be governed by the
procedural laws of the country where it is to be executed. 3' In
other respects, the Convention is similar to the New York Con-
vention,'32 discussed above, especially as to grounds for non-
enforcement 3 and reservations permitted."' Although substan-
'2 See Norberg, Inter-American Revisited, supra note 127, at 276, 285. The traditional
Calvo-oriented stance of Latin America toward arbitration is discussed herein.
... Inter-American Convention, supra note 127, at art. 4. See ABANY, The Inter-
American Convention, supra note 125, at 44; and Norberg, supra note 127, at 283.
1' Norberg, supra note 127, at 283.
32 Article 5(1)(2) of the Inter-American Convention is virtually identical to article V(1)(2)
of the New York Convention. The internal consistency of the two Conventions is noted in
ABANY, The Inter-American Convention, supra note 125, at 44, 66.
3 The Inter-American Convention, supra note 127, at art. 5(1), states:
1. The recognition and execution of the decision may be refused, at the request
of the party against which it is made, only if such party is able to prove to the
competent authority of the State in which recognition and execution are re-
quested:
a. That the parties to the agreement were subject to some incapacity
under the applicable law or that the agreement is not valid under the
law to which the parties have submitted it, or, if such law is not
specified, under the law of the State in which the decision was made; or
b. That the party against which the arbitral decision has been made
was not duly notified of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the ar-
bitration procedure to be followed, or was unable, for any other reason,
to present his defense; or
c. That the decision concerns a dispute not envisaged in the agree-
ment between the parties to submit to arbitration; nevertheless, if the
provisions of the decision that refer to issues submitted to arbitration
can be separated from those not submitted to arbitration, the former
may be recognized and executed; or
d. That the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitration pro-
cedure has not been carried out in accordance with the terms of the
agreement signed by the parties or, in the absence of such agreement,
that the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitration pro-
cedure has not been carried out in accordance with the law of the State
where the arbitration took place; or
e. That the decision is not yet binding on the parties or has been an-
nulled or suspended by a competent authority of the State in which, or
according to the law of which, the decision has been made.
13 Id. Art. 5(2) states:
The recognition and execution of an arbitral decision may also be refused if the
competent authority of the State in which the recognition and execution is re-
quested finds:
a. That the subject of the dispute cannot be settled by arbitration
under the law of that State; or
b. That the recognition or execution of the decision would be contrary
to the public policy ("ordre public") of that State.
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tively similar to the New York Convention,'35 the Inter-American
Convention represents a positive step by developing Latin
American countries. 136
E. FCN Treaties
Not all of the United States attempts to facilitate the enforce-
ment in foreign countries of awards rendered in the United States
have been multilateral. For example, the United States has
entered into several bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce,
and navigation (FCNs) 7 with both developing and developed
countries." Such treaties usually provide that awards rendered in
the other country are to be treated the same as domestic
awards,3 ' amounting to little more than declarations of non-
discrimination.1 40 An example of such a clause can be found in the
FCN treaty between the United States and Togo, ' which pro-
vides:
No award duly rendered pursuant to any such contract and final
and enforceable under the laws of the place where rendered,
shall be deemed invalid or denied effective means of enforce-
ment within the territories of either Party merely on the
grounds that the place where such award was rendered is out-
side such territories or that the nationality of one or more of the
arbitrators is not that of such Party."'
Although modest in scope, FCNs promote the usage of arbitration
between parties in the United States and parties in those states
with which FCNs have been concluded.
'" See ABANY, The Inter-American Convention, supra note 125, at 53, which suggests
reasons for a separate OAS Convention, despite its great similarity to the New York Con-
vention.
1" See ABANY, The Inter-American Convention, supra note 125, at 66-67; and Norberg,
supra note 127, at 285.
,' Such bilateral treaties are commonly and collectively known as friendship, commerce,
and navigation treaties (FCN), although the actual name of each individual treaty may vary.
See generally Evans & Ellis, supra note 36, at 49-51; Mirabito, supra note 11, at 479-81.
"u The countries with which the United States currently has FCN treaties that include
enforcement provisions are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iran, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Surinam,
Taiwan, Thailand, and Togo.
'" See Evans & Ellis, supra note 36, at 50.
14o 1&
"' Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, signed Feb. 8, 1966 at Lome (entered into
force Feb. 5, 1967), 18 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. 6193, 680 U.N.T.S. 159.
... Id. at art. III(3).
' ABANY, The Inter-American Convention, supra note 125, at 56. It is clear that courts
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VII. UNIFORM RECOGNITION ACT
It is important to note that all of the foregoing Conventions con-
cern only the enforcement of arbitral awards. None of the conven-
tions mention the enforcement of foreign country judgments. In-
deed, there have not been any successful multilateral attempts to
address or to codify procedures to enforce foreign country
judgments."' One reason for the non-existence of any such conven-
tions is that a judgment represents the act of a foreign sovereign
through its courts whereas an arbitral award does not. '45 Suspi-
cions as to motive and intention are much less likely to arise with
regard to a judgment than to an award.
of the United States will recognize and apply enforcement clauses within FCN treaties. See
In re Fotochrome, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd 517 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1975).
'" However, there has been a successful regional uniformization of enforcement
measures, concluded by the member states of the European Economic Community (EEC),
known as the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters. The relevant provisions are articles 26-49. Article 29 provides that
under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance, while article
26 provides that no special procedure is required for enforcement other than a simple re-
quest for enforcement. Article 27 enumerates the grounds upon which a judgment shall not
be recognized:
(1) if such recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in which the
recognition is sought;
(2) where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not duly
served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent
document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defense;
(3) if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between
the same parties in the State in which recognition is sought;
(4) if the court of the State in which the judgment was given, in order to arrive
at its judgment, has decided a preliminary question concerning the status or legal
capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial rela-
tionship, wills, or succession in a way that conflicts with a rule of the private
international law of the State in which the recognition is sought, unless the same
result would have been reached by the application of the rules of private inter-
national law of that State; or
(5) if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in a non-
Contracting State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties,
provided that this latter judgment fulfills the conditions necessary for its recognition
in the State addressed.
Unfortunately, this Convention applies only to those countries that are members of the
EEC, all of which are developed countries. It is hoped that the Convention will serve as a
starting point and model for future attempts to accomplish the same result on a worldwide
scale.
In addition to the EEC Convention on Enforcement, many bilateral conventions, too
numerous to list herein, have been concluded between developed countries concerning the
enforcement of foreign judgments. For a partial listing of those which the EEC Convention
on Enforcement supersedes, consult article 55 of the EEC Convention on Enforcement.
"' The distinctions between a foreign country judgment and an arbitral award are
discussed supra at p. 637.
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Although multilateral attempts to codify the enforcement of
foreign country judgments are lacking in the international com-
munity, the United States has proposed a Uniform Recognition
Act' 6 to be used by the individual states of the United States in
the enforcement of foreign money judgments. The purpose of the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act was alluded
to in the Commissioner's Prefatory Note:
Judgments rendered in the United States have in many in-
stances been refused recognition abroad either because the
foreign court was not satisfied that local judgments would be
recognized in the American jurisdiction involved or because no
certification of existence of reciprocity could be obtained from
the foreign government in countries where existence of
reciprocity must be certified to the courts by the government.
Codification by a state of its rules on the recognition of money-
,,8 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 [hereinafter cited as
Uniform Recognition Act]. 13 U.L.A. 417 (1980). The Uniform Recognition Act has been
adopted in eleven states, most notably New York and California, as indicated in the follow-
ing chart.
Jurisdiction Laws Effective Statutory Citation
Alaska ..................... 1972,c.68 8-16-1972 AS 09.30.100 to 09.30.180.
California .................. 1967,c.503 11-8-1967 West's Ann.Code Clv.
Proc.§§1713 to 1713.8.
Colorado ................... 1977,c.1977 7-1-1977 C.R.S.'73,13-62-101 to
13-62-109.
Illinois ..................... 1963,p.1506 7-15-1963 S.H.A.ch.77,§§121 to 129.
Maryland ................... 1963,c.201 6-1-1963 Code, Courts and Judicial
Proceedings, §§10-701
to 10-709.
Massachusetts .............. 1966,c.638 9-3-1966 M.G.L.A.c. 235 § 23A.
Michigan ................... 1967,No.191 11-2-1967 M.C.L.A. §§691.1151 to
691.1159.
New York .................. 1970,c.981 9-1-1970 McKinney's CPLR 5301
to 5309.
Oklahoma .................. 1965,c.448 6-30-1965 12 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 710 to
718.
Oregon ..................... 1977,c.61 10-4-1977 ORS 24.200 to 24.255.
Washington ................. 1975,c.240 6-26-1975 RCWA 6.40.010 to
1st Ex.Sess. 6.40.915.
The Georgia Code (§§ 110-1301-08) provisions are similar to the Uniform Recognition Act,
but are not recognized as an adoption of the Act. 13 U.L.A 417, 418 (1980).
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judgments rendered in a foreign court will make it more likely
that judgments rendered in the states will be recognized
abroad. 147
Basically, the Uniform Act provides that a "foreign judgment is
enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state
which is entitled to full faith and credit." '48 Section 4 of the
Uniform Act provides a number of grounds for non-recognition of
a foreign judgment,149 while section 5 lists several non-exclusive
bases of personal jurisdiction available to the foreign court."5
14 13 U.L.A. 417 (1980).
,, Uniform Recognition Act, supra note 146, Section 3.
,, Id Section 4 provides:
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide im-
partial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due pro-
cess of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive
notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action) [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between
the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise
than by proceedings in that court; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign
court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
,0 Id Section 5 states:
(a) The foreign judgment shall not be refused recognition for lack of personal
jurisdiction if
(1) the defendant was served personally in the foreign state;
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings, other than for the
purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the pro-
ceedings or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over him;
(3) the defendant prior to the commencement of the proceedings had agreed to
submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter
involved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state when the proceedings were
instituted, or, being a body corporate had its principal place of business, was in-
corporated, or had otherwise acquired corporate status, in the foreign state;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign state and the proceedings
in the foreign court involved a cause of action [claim for relief] arising out of
business done by the defendant through that office in the foreign state; or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state and
the proceedings involved a cause of action [claim for relief] arising out of such
operation.
(b) The courts of this state may recognize other bases of jurisd; .1.
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In order for a foreign money judgment to be enforceable under
the Uniform Recognition Act, the foreign judgment must be final,
conclusive, and enforceable where rendered. 5' In addition, the
party seeking enforcement must establish jurisdiction over the
defendant in the state where enforcement is sought.' Case law in-
dicates that the courts have been liberal in construing and finding
jurisdiction,' both in the foreign country and the state where en-
forcement is sought. One court found quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
through the attachment of the defendant's funds held in escrow
by a law firm in the state where enforcement was sought.'5 After
jurisdiction has been established, the judgment "is enforceable by
an action on the judgment, a motion for summary judgment in lieu
of a complaint, or in a pending action by counterclaim, cross-claim,
or affirmative defense. '' 5
Cases interpreting and applying the Uniform Recognition Act
as adopted in the various states have been fairly numerous."6 In
Bank of Montreal v. Kough,57 the court affirmed the judgment of
a lower court recognizing a Canadian default judgment against a
resident of California. Both courts used the Uniform Recognition
Act as adopted in California as the basis for recognizing the judg-
ment.1' The defendant challenged recognition and enforcement on
grounds of lack of due process and lack of reciprocity, both of
which the court rejected. Finding that due process had been
satisfied, 59 the court noted that reciprocity was not a requirement
to the enforcement of a foreign judgment in California,' and that
151 Id. Section 2 states: "This Act applies to any foreign judgment that is final and con-
clusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is
subject to appeal." Id
52 Biel v. Bochm, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (1978).
Id See also Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2nd
Cir. 1973); Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Col. 1977), aff'd 612 F.2d 467
(9th Cir. 1980); New Central Jute Mills Co. v. City Trade & Industries Ltd., 318 N.Y.S.2d
980 (1971). Contra Julen v. Larson, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1972).
" See Biel v. Boehm, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1978).
" Id at 233, citing C.P.L.R. § 5303 of New York.
5 The cases relevant to this discussion are: Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp.
1243 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd 612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co.,
377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd 517 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1975); Island Territory of
Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2nd Cir. 1973); Julen v. Larson, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1972); New Central Jute Mills Co. v. City Trade & Industries Ltd., 318 N.Y.S.2d
980 (1971).
"' Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affd 612 F.2d 467 (9th
Cir. 1980).
SId. at 1246.
15' 612 F.2d at 470-71.
'" Id at 472.
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the Uniform Recognition Act had intentionally failed to mention
reciprocity, "apparently on the ground that the due process con-
cepts embodied in the Act were an adequate safeguard for the
rights of citizens sued on judgments obtained abroad."'' 1 The
lower court had rejected the defendant's claim that the forum was
inconvenient. 6' However, in Julen v. Larson,6 ' the court refused
to enforce a Swiss judgment because due process requirements
had not been satisfied. The court found that the foreign court had
not given the defendant proper notice.'
Some of the judgments enforced under the Uniform Recognition
Act have involved the enforcement of a judgment upholding an ar-
bitral award.' In Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices,
Inc.,6 the court, by virtue of New York's Uniform Recognition
Act, enforced a Curacaoan judgment rendered pursuant to an ar-
bitral award."7 The court held that the New York Convention as
applied to arbitral awards "in no way purports to prevent states
from enforcing foreign money judgments, whether those
judgments are rendered in the enforcement of an arbitration
award or otherwise.""' Similarly, the New York Supreme Court
granted summary judgment in lieu of a complaint to enforce a
judgment rendered in India pursuant to an arbitral award. 69 The
court held that where the defendant had proper notice of the con-
firmation proceedings in India, the resulting judgment could not
be challenged successfully in New York on defenses that should
have been raised in India." °
However, in Fotochrome v. Copal Company,7' the court found
"' Id. at 471-72.
... 430 F. Supp. 1243, 1250-51.
Julen v. Larson, 101 Cal. Rptr, 796 (1972).
16 The court based its decision upon the fact that the "[diefendant did not understand the
language in which the legal documents were written, and the accompanying correspondence
did not identify the documents as materials of legal significance." Id. at 798.
" Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2nd Cir. 1973); In
re Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affd 517 F.2d 512 (2nd
Cir. 1975) (the court enforced the award not the judgment); New Central Jute Mills Co. v.
City Trade & Industries Ltd., 318 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1971).
'" 489 F.2d 1313 (2nd Cir. 1973).
117 Solitron did not participate in the arbitration proceedings or the proceedings before
the Court of First Instance, where the writ of execution was granted in compliance with the
law of the Netherlands Antilles. 489 F.2d at 1316-17.
16 Id. at 1318.
ISO New Central Jute Mills Co. v. City Trade & Industries Ltd., 318 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1971).
170 Id. at 985.
171 In re Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co., 377 F.Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd 517 F.2d 512
(2nd Cir. 1975).
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that even though under the Japanese Code of Procedure an ar-
bitral award has the same effect as a judgment rendered in
Japan,"2 the arbitral award would not be recognized or treated as
a judgment in the United States until a judgment on the award
was actually rendered in Japan."13 Therefore, the court refused to
enforce the award under New York's Uniform Recognition Act.
Recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments has
not been limited to those states that have adopted the Uniform
Recognition Act, but rather has occurred in other states as well,
where the courts relied on common law principles and comity.'" In
Somportex Limited v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., ' the
court enforced an English default judgment on the basis of comity
as espoused in Hilton v. Guyot.'8 The court noted that "[c]omity
should be withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or
prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it ef-
fect."'" Likewise, the court in Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham
Corp.'8 enforced a Canadian default judgment on the basis of comity,
holding that
[g]enerally, Texas courts will recognize such a decree where the
foreign court is a competent one having jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter, where there was an opportunity
for a full and fair hearing before an unbiased tribunal, and
where there was no fraud in the procurement of the judgment
or any other special reason for dishonoring it.' 5
Regardless of where enforcement is sought or upon what basis,
the defense of public policy has arisen.'" Just as courts faced with
' "Article 800 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure provides: 'An [arbitral] award
shall have the same effect as a judgment which is final and conclusive between the
parties.' " Id. at 518.
173 Id. at 519.
,7 Somportex Limited v. Phil. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert.
denied 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Texas 1980)
(judgment not recognized because still pending in foreign country where rendered); Royal
Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Texas 1980) Toronto-Dominion
Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
" Somportex Limited v. Phil. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert.
denied 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
,' Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
... Somportex Limited v. Phil. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert.
denied 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
,78 Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Texas 1980).
Id. at 406.
, Somportex Limited v. Phil. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert.
denied 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Texas 1980);
Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
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the public policy defense in arbitral award confirmation pro-
ceedings, the courts have construed narrowly the public policy
defense in enforcement of judgment proceedings. 8 '
Enforcement of a judgment of a foreign court based on the law
of the foreign jurisdiction does not offend the public policy of
the forum simply because the body of foreign law upon which
the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or
because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment
creditor than the law of the forum would have been had the
original suit been brought at the forum. The very idea of a law
of conflicts of laws presupposes differences in the laws of
various jurisdictions and that different initial results may be ob-
tained depending on whether one body of law is applied or
another.'82
A narrow construction of the defenses to enforcement of judg-
ments under the Uniform Recognition Act is necessary if the Act
is to operate effectively. It is hoped that the Act and the narrow
construction of defenses to it will be noticed within the interna-
tional community and that it will serve as a catalyst for increased
cooperation.
VIII. NATIONAL LEGISLATION
In light of the discussion thus far, it should be clear that, even
under the various international conventions, the national law of
each individual nation plays an important role in the enforcement
of a judgment or arbitral award." Therefore, a comparison of na-
,8, The court rejected a public policy violation claim even though the foreign judgment
allowed recovery of costs not recoverable in the state of Pennsylvania. Somportex Limited
v. Phil. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
The Somportex Court quoted another Pennsylvania case, Goodyear v. Brown, 155 Pa. 514,
518, 26 A. 665, 666 (1893), in declaring that enforcement is contra to public policy in Penn-
sylvania when enforcement
tends clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, the public confidence
in the purity of the administration of the law, or to undermine that sense of
security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property,
which any citizen ought to feel is against public policy.
453 F.2d at 443 (1971). In Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Texas 1980),
the court adopted the above definition and dismissed the defendant's public policy violation
claim.
182 Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1016 (E.D. Ark. 1973). Adopted by
the court in Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. 492 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Texas 1980).
18" Geneva Protocol, supra note 36, art. 3; Geneva Convention supra note 37, art. 1; New
York Convention, supra note 44, art. III; ICSID, supra note 110, art. 54(1); Inter-American
Convention, supra note 127, art. 4.
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tional legislation is relevant. Basically, there are two systems for
the enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards incorporated
into the national laws of most nations: common law and civil law.'"
"In most civil law countries, enforcement, if allowed at all, re-
quires the court approval by a special validation proceeding,
generally known as the exequatur. In common law countries, the
traditional method of enforcement is an ordinary civil suit based
on the foreign judgment."'" Both systems are important within
the developing world because of the former colonial relationships
of many of the developing countries with Great Britain, a common
law country, and with France, a civil law country.
The common law system, which requires an action on the judg-
ment, is used throughout the British Commonwealth as well as in
many of that country's former colonies, including the United States.
In regard to case law concerning enforcement in the United States, it
should be kept in mind that the common law "treats the foreign
judgment as an obligation which, although conclusive, is not en-
forceable in another state, but must first be converted into a new
domestic judgment by an action in debt to recover the amount owing
under the foreign judgment."'' 8
The civil law system, characterized by the exequatur process, is
in essence a proceeding through which the foreign judgment or ar-
bitral award is validated or given legal significance in the re-
quested forum. 87 After the exequatur has been granted, the
foreign judgment or arbitral award is treated as if it were a
domestic judgment. l8
All of the Latin American countries use the civil law
exequatur.'i 9 In general, Latin American countries grant foreign
18 Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Yorker
Reflects on Uniform Acts, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 376 (1970). A third method, judgment
registration, is also discussed by the author.
Judgment registration should not be confused with the 'execution' of the civil law
or the common law action on a foreign judgment. Unlike these two enforcement
methods, judgment registration in its pure form operates as an automatic valida-
tion device without any judicial supervision. The filing in the county clerk's or
other registrar's office of an authenticated copy of the foreign judgment, together
with other proof required by local law, converts the foreign judgment at once into
a domestic judgment on which execution may issue without further ado.
Id at 396. Judgment registration in its pure form is not presently applied to foreign country
judgments and is therefore of limited significance to this discussion.
18 Id at 377.
... Id at 378.
"' Id. at 377.
188 Id.
'8 See INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE-AMERICAN CON-
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judgments the force given them through treaties.19 ° If no treaty
exists, foreign judgments are given the same force as a judgment
of the particular country where enforcement is sought.191 Each
country has several requisites, including the exequatur, which
must be satisfied before the judgment can be enforced. 2 Subject
to several variations, the procedure outlined within the Code of
Civil Procedure of Argentina serves as an effective example for
the entire region. Armed with a foreign judgment, the party seek-
ing enforcement in Argentina must file a request for execution of
the judgment before a judge of first instance having proper juris-
diction. 93 Five days before the scheduled hearing the petitioner
must file a petition for exequatur with the judge and with the
respondent.'" Within the five days, the respondent may request
that the exequatur be rejected,19' at which time the petitioner is
notified of the respondent's protest.'" The judge then makes his
decision, which may be appealed within five days.'97 If on appeal
the exequatur is rejected, the petitioner has no further recourse
and the exequatur is denied.' 8 If the exequatur is granted, court
proceedings are conducted for execution just as if it were an
Argentine judgment.' Article 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure
of Argentina states the requisities for the issuance of the exe-
quatur:
1) That the judgment to be enforced be the result of the pro-
secution of a personal legal action;'0'
2) That it not be a judgment by default against the condemned
TINENT (L. Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski ed. 1975). The book discusses, among other things, the
enforcement procedure of each Latin American country; Argentina (8-13); Bolivia (28),
Brazil (51-62), Chile (141-156), Colombia (167), Costa Rica (197-202), Ecuador (214-215), Mexico
(308-311), Nicaragua (333-336), Panama (342-344), Paraguay (357), Peru (369-370), Uruguay
(425-430), Venezuela (449-454).
I& Jd As to each country, consult the pages listed at note 90 supra.
... Id As to each country, consult the pages listed at note 90 supra.
' Id As to each country, consult the pages listed at note 90 supra.




"' Id Code of Civil Procedure Art. 561, 228.
1,8 Id.
199 Id
The distinction here is between personal actions and those in rem. Since execution of
in rem judgments would "affect things permanently located in Argentina," enforcement
would be in conflict with Argentine law (Art. 10, 11 of Civil Code).
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party, provided such party has been domiciled in the
Republic; '
3) That the obligation on which the judgment is based be valid
under [Argentine] laws;.. and
4) That the judgment to be enforced meet the conditions which
under the law of the country where it has been rendered,
are necessary for the judgment to be considered as such,
and also those required under Argentine law.0 3
Most of the procedures of other Latin American countries par-
allel those of Argentina, with some variations. For example, some
countries will recognize default judgments if the defendant was
given proper notice 14 or if reciprocity exists between the two
countries. 5 It is significant that the enforcement procedure for
arbitral awards is the same as that of a judgment in most of the
countries. No distinction is made between a judgment and an ar-
bitral award for purposes of obtaining an exequatur and subse-
quent enforcement, with the exception that the arbitral award
must have been rendered pursuant to a matter capable of settle-
ment by arbitration.! 6 Brazil requires that the arbitral award first
be reduced to a judgment in the country where the award was
rendered, °0 while Costa Rica does not recognize or enforce awards
because of the lack of any such provisions within its code of civil
procedure.2 °0
As stated, in common law countries, a party seeking enforce-
ment of a judgment must bring an action upon the judgment, while
in civil law countries, the same party must obtain an exequatur.
201 Execution of default judgments against one who, at the start of the foreign pro-
ceedings, was a domiciliary of Argentina, is against the due process of laws of Argentina.
' This requisite is largely directed at foreign judgments relating to divorces and family
matters and is not of great concern in the economic area. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE-AMERICAN CONTINENT, supra note 189, at 11-12.
This requirement mandates that the foreign judgment be valid, final and enforceable
where rendered. Id. at 12.
' Countries which will recognize a default judgment if proper notice is given are: Bolivia
(id. at 28), Brazil (id. at 53), Costa Rica (i& at 207), Mexico (id. at 309), Nicaragua (id. at 335),
Panama (id. at 343), Uruguay (Ud. at 427), and Venezuela (id. at 450).
"05 The countries which require reciprocity are: Chile (id at 143), Colombia (id. at 168),
Guatemala (id. at 262-263), Mexico (id. at 309), Nicaragua (id. at 334), Panama (id. at 342),
Uruguay (id. at 427), Venezuela (id at 449).
Id- at 10. In Argentina, the non-arbitrable matter relevant to this discussion is any
dispute referring to public or municipal property. Id at 10, 28 (Bolivia), 153 (Chile), 167 (Col-
ombia), 239 (El Salvador), 262 (Guatemala), 284 (Honduras), 357 (Paraguay), 370 (Peru), 429
(Uruguay), 454 (Venezuela).
Id at 62, 156 (Chile), 336 (Nicaragua).
18 Id at 202.
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The two devices are obviously functionally and operationally
quite similar. Both are predicated upon the principles of a
bilateral hearing and judicial supervision of the enforcement of
the foreign judgment. Both afford the judgment debtor a limited
opportunity to voice objections, directed mainly to the regularity
of the foreign proceedings and the foreign court's jurisdiction.
Both proceed like an ordinary contested civil suit if the judg-
ment debtor protests enforcement. Many American jurisdic-
tions, including New York, provide for summary disposition of
actions on a judgment without a full trial when it appears that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Such a pro-
cedure compares favorably with the exequatur of the civil law.2
Therefore, a party armed with a judgment or an arbitral award
need not be concerned primarily with the type of jurisdiction,
whether common or civil, in which enforcement will be sought.
However, the party must be concerned with the construction and
interpretation the courts of the particular country have tradi-
tionally placed upon the various defenses to the exequatur or
upon the action on the judgment.
IX. IMPROVEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
The existence of the common law and civil law systems, along
with the national variations of the two, illustrates the need for a
worldwide uniformization of enforcement procedures for
judgments as well as for arbitral awards. Such a uniformization
would not only represent true internationalization, but also would
facilitate the growth of international trade by removing many of
the current problems and barriers to enforcement and by pro-
viding certainty to the resolution of economic disputes."'
Worldwide procedures for the enforcement of judgments and ar-
bitral awards would, to a substantial degree, alleviate the tradi-
tional problems associated with enforcement. Reciprocity,
sovereign immunity, and the act of state doctrine would be lesser
obstacles to enforcement if nations could agree upon uniform en-
forcement measures. Distrust, although not amenable to complete
eradication, would be diminished significantly by the standardiza-
tion of enforcement procedures.
One method that would diminish enforcement problems is im-
plementation of an international court system, similar to the
Homburger, supra at 184, at 378.
2~O See Wesley, supra note 3, 814-15, 859-61; Achebe, supra note 2, at 172.
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federal court system of the United States, in which full faith and
credit prevail. Such a court system would treat each nation as a
component in the system just as each state is treated in the
United States system. Enforcement of a sister state judgment,
under full faith and credit, does not pose a serious problem in the
United States, nor would enforcement of foreign country judg-
ments in an international system. The International Court of
Justice, although international in scope, is not representative of
such a system. However, an international court system under
which full faith and credit applies is probably many years away.
Indeed, it is little more than a dream of international academi-
cians.
The adoption of full faith and credit within the international
community, however, is more likely to become a reality through
multilateral treaties. This is the course that should be taken. A
comprehensive treaty that applies to judgments and arbitral
awards alike, and under which full faith and credit is given to the
final judgments of a foreign court or tribunal, subject only to due
process considerations, would make international summary en-
forcement a reality." Until the implementation of such a treaty,
nations should continue to adhere to current treaties and en-
courage further accession to the treaties.
X. CONCLUSION
Most foreign country judgments and arbitral awards are com-
plied with voluntarily for reasons of comity, the desire to co-exist
peacefully, and to avoid adverse economic repercussions.
However, many foreign judgments and arbitral awards are not en-
forced voluntarily because of public policy concerns and a distrust
among nations in general, particularly among developing and
developed countries. Rather than openly admit public policy con-
cerns and distrust, the courts of many nations, both developed
and developing, have created such obstacles to enforcement as
reciprocity and political doctrines.
National legislation regarding the enforcement of foreign
judgments and arbitral awards varies, yet it usually comports to
one of two systems, the common law system or the civil law
system. The common law system requires an action on the judg-
ment while the civil law system requires the obtainment of an exe-
"' The EEC Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 144, would serve as a good model and
would provide a convenient starting point in this area.
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quatur before enforcement can be ordered. Several multilateral
attempts have been made to standardize enforcement measures as
to arbitral awards. These attempts have become progressively
better; yet even the best-the New York Convention-leaves
much room for improvement. No successful worldwide
multilateral attempt has been made to standardize foreign coun-
try enforcement procedures.
International summary enforcement of foreign judgments and
arbitral awards will not realize its full potential until full faith and
credit becomes a part of international law. In the interest of inter-
national economic trade, it behooves all countries, developed and
developing, to pursue such an objective.
Michael Quilling
